The resignation of the MQM members from the Sindh Assembly and Parliament have attracted comparisons with the Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI) members’ resignations last year, and once again, have not been accepted. It now appears that a new category of resignation has gained acceptance: one which is not meant to be accepted. The government is still working hard to make the MQM reconsider the decision. It may be that it realises that the MQM’s resignation is very portentous, even more so than the resignation of an orthodox political party, because it is not a national party, but a representative of a section of the population. That in turn means that the next step is radicalisation towards separatism. So far, the MQM has not even raised the slogan of a separate province; now the way has been opened for the demand of a separate state.
It should be remembered that the MQM is not merely a regional party, or a cover for criminal activity, but the vehicle by which an important section of the population expresses its aspirations. For it to abandon the parliamentary path either means that it is losing its grip on its electorate, or that radicals arguing for extraparliamentary solutions, are winning the debates within the party. The MQM has not shown any loss of its votebank, though the PTI is posing it a strong challenge. It must also be noted that the resignations have come at a time when local body polls are around the corner. They would test the MQM in the same arena that first marked its emergence, back in 1988. It should also be noted that the resignations have also come at a time when the MQM is facing immense pressure because of the operation within Karachi against target killings, protection rackets and other crimes, not to mention MQM chief Altaf Hussain’s legal troubles in the UK. The MQM link has been difficult to conceal with more than one raid on MQM central headquarters at 90 Azizabad leading to arrests.
This has also got the MQM into a clash with the armed forces, for the raids have not been conducted by the police, but the Rangers. The Rangers have been given police duties in Karachi, and thus represent a point of entry for both the federal government, which controls the Rangers through the Interior Ministry, and the Army, which provides the Rangers its officers. This has led to Altaf getting into a criticism of the Rangers, and accusing it of an anti-MQM bias in its operations in Karachi. The Army has become involved in defending the Rangers, and thus criticising Altaf and the MQM. Altaf’s troubles with the Army will not be ended by these resignations, and will probably be worsened by them.
One problem the MQM faces is that less than half the life of the Parliament (and the Sindh Assembly) remains, and thus the by-elections which these resignations will cause, will be crucial. There has been one report that the MQM will take part in the by-election. If the general election results had meant narrow victories, then losses would be expected, as at least some voters wondered why be put through the whole exercise, but the MQM had won its usual thumping victories, indicating that even a reduction in the number of votes would still lead to MQM by-election victories. However, even if it loses, any improvement by the PTI over its general election result would lead to an erosion of the MQM’s aura of invincibility.
It is interesting that the MQM has remained satisfied with piling up huge majorities, and has not asked for a proportional representation system, modified or otherwise, allowing it to convert those huge majorities into more seats. Perhaps one reason is that the PPP also piles up huge majorities in rural Sindh, and any MQM scheme to benefit would be balanced or cancelled out.
The ruling PML(N) would not like PTI gains, because that would have a knock-on effect in its stronghold of Punjab. That helps explain why it is working so hard to stop the MQM from resigning. It must be noted that the MQM has its first experience of being in the opposition, as it has previously been the junior partner of whichever party formed the government. It might be remembered that the MQM had left the Assemblies before, during the 1992 Karachi operation, which was part of an overall Sindh operation, by the then Nawaz government. At that time, there had been a split engineered within the MQM, with MNAs and MPAs belonging to the faction backed by Muhammad Afaq and Amir Khan, supporting the government, and the rest, the majority, resigning. That experience, when by-elections were not held, provides an example of what happens when the MQM resigns. Nothing, not even the fall of the government. It cannot be forgotten that on that occasion, the PPP was short of an absolute majority in the House, but without the MQM members, the government still tried to avoid a vote on anything. However, the MQM had previously been used to threatening to leave the government, with resigning from the Assemblies a back-up threat. Now, it has to be the first threat.
The resignations followed rowdiness in the Sindh and National Assemblies. That rowdiness is a possible parliamentary tactic, though it seldom yields any result, and is not approved of. Resignations are a possibility for those who have chosen that track. However, as the MQM found out, they do not yield the desired result either. The provincial assemblies still passed resolutions against Altaf Hussain for his remarks about the Rangers.
The episode has allowed the JUI(F) to enjoy a moment in the limelight. It too has an in-built clash with the PTI, because of their competition in KPK. It also has an interest in Karachi because of the huge Pashtun population there. However, its success or failure will not change the fact that the MQM’s remaining in the Assemblies or otherwise will not solve the problems which caused it to emerge in the first place. It may be argued that the MQM leadership would not want those problems solved, because it would mean that the Muhajir community would no longer back it. However, that those problems exist must be acknowledged. And their solution is the responsibility of the government, whether federal or provincial.
The JUI-F initiative received a setback from the attack on MQM deputy parliamentary leader Rashid Godil, but was not derailed by it. That shows that both sides are singleminded about the initiative proceeding, which in turn means the MQM regards the resignations as a tool rather than an end.
The MQM has been part of the government, but that has not led to the Muhajirs’ problems being solved. The abandoning of parliamentarianism means the abandoning of governance. The only path left is that of revolutionism. Even if the current MQM leadership does not see that as a viable path, they might find their followers abandoning them in favour of leaders willing to follow it. And as its history has shown, the Muhajir community has switched its support from one party to another, depending on whether it sees it as solving its issues. In fact, the time it has supported the MQM has been the longest it has backed any party, something based on the fact that the MQM, unlike previous favourites, uses the rhetoric of Muhajir issues, without the cloak of nationalism or religion. Revolutionism is the real danger, not just for others, but for the Muhajir community itself.