In April 2024, Beijing had a role in facilitating reconciliation talks between two Palestinian groups, the Hamas and Fatah. Although there were no concrete results, the parties showed their dedication to advancing internal Palestinian solidarity. China is currently making significant efforts to establish a prominent position in the Middle East by actively facilitating the negotiation of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. These two players have conflicted with the October 7 tragedy.

Fatah and Hamas are the predominant political forces in Palestine; however, they have been physically segregated since 2007. Hamas has firmly consolidated its dominance in the Gaza Strip, while Fatah maintains power over the West Bank. Their reactions to the Israel-Palestine issue have consistently displayed significant differences, leading to the perception of “Palestinian representation” as being associated with internal disputes, lack of cohesion, and declining legitimacy. Although there were no high hopes for significant advancements or notable accomplishments in the negotiations, Beijing recognized a chance to position itself as an alternative mediator and a balancing force against the United States. The purpose was to exhibit its support and solidarity for the Palestinian people while also striving for a greater role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, the conversations may also function as a method for Beijing to legitimize Hamas as a political organization, as China maintains the notion that the issue can only be resolved amicably by including Hamas.

However, Beijing currently lacks the necessary experience, power, and diplomatic contacts to significantly alter the course of the ongoing conflict or achieve significant results in negotiating a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. While the reconciliation talks may improve China’s favorability among regional powers and countries referred to as the Global South by Beijing, China is anticipated to maintain a supporting stance rather than actively mediating.

Fatah, established in 1959, is Palestine’s prevailing secular political party. Mahmoud Abbas, a co-founder of the Fatah Party, has been serving as the chairman since 2009. Fatah currently maintains the dominant position within the PLO, a coalition of political parties involved in signing the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords with Israel. At first, Fatah utilized guerrilla strategies to confront Israel, but subsequently, the organization renounced violence and recognized the presence of Israel. Fatah subsequently embraced a more diplomatic approach to addressing the crisis, setting itself apart from Hamas and other militant groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas is an offshoot of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, which was initially established in Egypt. Hamas was formed in reaction to the start of the First Intifada in 1987. It gained control over Gaza and became the de-facto ruling authority after winning the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2005, which took place following Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The principal financial support for the movement comes from Iran, and it has a long-standing partnership with the Lebanon-based militant organization Hezbollah. Several nations, including the US, EU member states, the United Kingdom, and Canada, have formally designated Hamas as a terrorist organization.

The Beijing summit closely followed a similar visit to Moscow in March, where discussions were held with up to 14 Palestinian factions to achieve internal Palestinian unity. Hamad and Fatah have affirmed their strong dedication to cooperate and synchronize their endeavors for the forthcoming reconstruction of Gaza following the battle. The primary objective of the negotiations was to incorporate Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, into the PLO and streamline the establishment of a new government for the Palestinian Authority (PA). The US has consistently exerted pressure on this government to undergo significant reorganization and change in order to take power in Gaza after the war ends.

Beijing is widely regarded as somewhat neutral, which is likely why the factions accepted Xi Jinping’s invitation. China does not have any significant military ties or engagement with Iran, a country that poses a fundamental threat to Israel, or with Syria, which is a neighboring country of Israel. Unlike the US, Beijing has not traditionally provided consistent support to Israel. On the contrary, it has continuously demonstrated its endorsement of seeking an equitable solution for the Palestinian population. Consequently, China is regarded as a more suitable partner for reconciliation talks. China has shown its intention to take advantage of the progress made in the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran and to prove itself as a credible alternative to the US since the beginning of the recent Israel-Hamas war. China’s current efforts to reconcile the conflicting Palestinian factions demonstrate that although Beijing may not have the ability to broker a truce between Hamas and Israel, it may function as a diplomatic intermediary. The conversations can also be seen as Beijing’s effort to promote and reinforce its narrative that it regularly backs and aligns with the Palestinians. This phenomenon occurs as Beijing’s sway in the region grows, while regional actors are disenchanted with the US and acknowledging the potential economic benefits of forging ties with Beijing.

If Fatah and Hamas can agree with the help of China, it might allow Beijing to play a bigger part in the rebuilding of Gaza after the conflict. This would involve improving the physical infrastructure and setting up systems to govern the region. However, achieving concord between the two factions is still uncertain. Given the contrasting perspectives on the war and Hamas’ reluctance to recognize the existence of Israel, Fatah may encounter difficulties in establishing productive cooperation with Hamas, given the present circumstances. Furthermore, the current reconciliation efforts are in their first phase, and the two parties have not yet agreed on a system of governance and a framework for the fair allocation of power.

China can offer aid and support in the reconciliation talks but lacks the influence to mediate actively. Although both factions recognized Beijing’s influence in promoting solidarity among Palestinians, the prospects for reconciliation will remain limited unless Hamas undertakes significant modifications to its principles.

Abu Hurrairah Abbasi
The Writer works as a Researcher with an Islamabad-based policy think tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. He can be reached at abuhurrairahah@gmail.com