It’s that time of the year again. Balochistan has regained its importance as the strategic culmination point of the proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and all its $46 billion glory. The unpolished jewel of the Makran coast, Gwadar, has rekindled the interest it gained during the early-2000s as a potential gateway for trade to the Arabian Sea from China’s restive western provinces, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian states. The power of such a mega-project has the potential of changing the face of Pakistan, and even the whole region, for many generations to come. Or so they say. But one question CPEC must address for its success is with regards to the on-going insurgency in Balochistan, ethno-sectarian violence, and allegations of human rights abuses.

By many accounts, we are witnessing the fifth wave of Baloch insurgency since 1948. It has been the most widespread and is attracting attention by various quarters at home and abroad. The mishandling of dissent towards the Gwadar Port in 2000s as well as hostilities with the elderly Nawab Akbar Bugti – a former Governor and Chief Minister of Balochistan – culminated in his death during a military operation ignited the fifth wave in 2006. Attacks on security forces, state ‘informants’, and non-Baloch ‘settlers’ were witnessed from Gwadar till Quetta, and many of us outside the restive province thought a repeat of 1971 was taking place. Groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have been at the forefront since early 2000s but the 2006 events intensified their popularity and notoriety. Led by Mir Balaach Marri, an ambitious son of 1970s veteran Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, the BLA and its supporters from a conglomerate of Baloch nationalist-separatist political groups like BSO-Azad, BNM, BNF etc seemed to have an upper hand in dictating this insurgency and pressing the State of Pakistan into either outright giving up on Balochistan or at the very least forcing a change in the relationship.

But something went wrong. The effects were slow at first but became more prominent with each passing year. By this author’s estimate, the first schism within the separatist militancy happened when Akbar Bugti’s favourite grandson Brahamdagh Bugti and his loyalists went their own path to form the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) soon after the death of the Nawab instead of joining the Marri-led BLA. The sympathies and anger towards Nawab Bugti’s death meant many impressionable fighters flocked to BRA’s call from even the non-tribal regions of Makran and started spreading their operations beyond the usual hub of Dera Bugti and Sibi-Bolan regions. This naturally put BLA in a fix as it started to lose steam. The death of Balaach Marri in mysterious circumstances on the Pak-Afghan border in 2007 certainly was a devastating blow from which things began to slowly unravel.

Gradually, the senior tribal separatist leaders fled abroad, Brahamdagh to Afghanistan and then finally Switzerland by 2011. BLA’s next apparent leaders Hyrbyair and Mehran Marri (Balaach’s other brothers) took asylum in Europe. Brahamdagh Bugti, for sake of political correctness, says he is merely a leader of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) and has nothing to do with BRA – though most dismiss that claim as BRP is more or less the political wing of BRA. And if that wasn’t bad enough, differences between Hyrbyair and Mehran led to the latter and his followers splitting and going their own path. A new group, the United Baloch Army (UBA) emerged which swears allegiance to Mehran Marri, though he denies any affiliation with UBA and insists that he is a political leader.

At the same time, another force emerged that further fragmented the separatist militancy. A young doctor from the southern Awaran district named Allah Nazar Muhammad Hasni was already a founding leader of BSO-Azad since early 2000s before forming his own insurgent group the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) that took a marked direction away from tribal-oriented BLA and BRA and essentially took the whole Makran region under its scope. Dr Allah Nazar’s BLF is now regarded as the most ruthless and brutal of all given its main cadre of non-tribal middle and working class Baloch among its fighters. Former Senator Javed Mengal – himself a son of 1970s veteran Sardar Attaullah Mengal – and his sons are also said to command the Lashkar-e-Balochistan who may not be as prominent as the main groups but can still cause some nuisance here and there. The self-exiled Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleman Daud Khan, tried to make himself the leader of a separatist coalition, though his efforts have not gained much fruition as his royal post has increasingly lost its privilege in contemporary times.

The separatist militants have regularly attacked civilians and justifying it by accusations of ‘informants’ or ‘traitors.’ Victims range from school teachers and university professors, to shopkeepers, government officials, journalists, and even barbers. These attacks have caused a great exodus of many non-Baloch ‘settlers’, as well as many Baloch, to other parts of Pakistan over the last decade or so, causing a devastating impact on Balochistan’s state machinery and economy. It has certainly caused many sections of the public in Balochistan to rethink and even criticise those claiming to fight for their rights. The state response is said to be Machiavellian, with accusations of forced disappearances, kill-and-dump tactics, and alleged arming of pro-state ‘death squads’ flying around each and every day. Government spokesmen repeatedly deny or dismiss the accusations.

The differences among Khair Bakhsh Marri’s sons came to the fore with the elderly Nawab’s death in 2014 in Karachi, from old age. His eldest son, Changez, essentially heads PML-N in Balochistan and aims to be the next Chief Minister, though he has to face stiff competition from fellow PML-N Balochistan strongman Nawab Sanaullah Zehri in this regard. After the tragic Mastung bus attack in June, many alleged UBA commanders gave up their arms and surrendered in a public ceremony to Changez Marri – almost to discredit the power and prestige of his exiled younger brothers. Other militants have also ‘surrendered’ to Sanaullah Zehri in recent months while Balochistan Home Minister Sarfraz Bugti has been the main guest for many BRA surrenders.

One wonders how true such ‘surrender’ ceremonies are in the first place. However, there is no doubt about how fragmented the militancy has become: a plethora of groups all apparently fighting for the same thing but going their own separate ways for various reasons (tribal, ideological, political, regional etc). Such a fragmented and divided insurgency certainly makes them highly vulnerable for infiltration and manipulation through covert operations from various intelligence agencies (domestic and foreign). News of BLF commander Dr Allah Nazar being dead, or dying, have been frequent since last few years, but have gained intensity in recent weeks, which implies state forces tightening its noose around the most radical separatist faction.

Balochistan, as a whole, has a fairly low population, with many urban centres and regions being isolated from each other due to great distances and unkind topography. This demographic disadvantage has meant that not only does Balochistan have low priority in Pakistan’s 68 year existence, but it also significantly constrains any militancy from having the desired impact of ‘freeing Balochistan’ no matter how much support it may allegedly enjoy from various patrons worldwide. It certainly doesn’t help their cause nor their credibility when their own supporters allege at same time that everything in Balochistan is now controlled by the security establishment (Army, FC, and intelligence agencies).

It can be implied that this insurgency has lost its way and credibility long ago. It has failed to achieve anything substantial nor does it have the capability of causing any retreat or defeat of state forces today. The local population – already sparse and isolated – is either apathetic towards the separatists if not downright hostile towards the precious lives lost with nothing achieved. The exiled separatist leaders may try all they want but they are effectively redundant and inert. The odd remaining violent separatist at home is being ruthlessly pursued by the state by any means necessary. And that won’t end well with the former or the unarmed and unaffiliated locals either.

The insurgency and all its factions and fragmented reality, has reached a cul-de-sac, wherein the insurgents cannot go any further and can either try to negotiate some way out to end hostilities or keep fighting till they are ruthlessly pulverised by the state without any respite.

Maybe this would explain why in recent years some on-and-off talks have been taking place to pacify the exiled leaders and persuading local militant commanders to give up and surrender. Such an effort is not only laudable but appears to be only way out in gradually pacifying Balochistan if the whole CPEC publicity is to achieve the desired results on the ground. The unilateralism of mid-2000s appears to have made way for a truly multilateral approach in 2015 to bring peace and stability in Balochistan and ensure all local grievances of bad governance, neglect, and violence are properly addressed. The nationalist parties, so often eyed with suspicion by rest of the country, have been encouraged to play a more positive role in domestic politics. Only then can secessionist sentiments be pacified and the people of Balochistan given a sense of true security and recognition they have craved for decades. Patriotism is a good thing for all citizens, but it is the state’s duty to ensure that it reciprocates with necessary incentives for its citizenry without discrimination. The future of Pakistan depends on the future of Balochistan.