Recent events in Bangladesh clearly indicate a rejection of Indian dominance and interference in the country’s internal affairs, culminating in the end of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule by a youth movement that initially arose over the controversial quota system. Since 5 August 2024, Indian media, under the influence of the Indian establishment, has expressed frustration over the loss of Indian influence and assets in Bangladesh, spinning conspiracy theories that blame Pakistan, China, and the USA for Sheikh Hasina’s ouster.
However, the reality is quite different. Across South Asia, from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, smaller states are increasingly adopting a policy of keeping “India Out” of their internal matters. Since the partition of India and the formation of modern India in 1947, India has pursued a foreign policy characterized by dominance, hegemony, and bullying, particularly towards smaller states like Pakistan, in an effort to control the region’s domestic politics.
The teachings of the ancient Indian strategist Chanakya (375 BC), who argued in his seminal work “Arthashastra” that “Your neighbor is your natural enemy and your neighbor’s neighbor is your friend,” still hold significant influence over Indian leaders, particularly in foreign policy. From Nehru to Modi, India’s efforts to impose dominance over South Asia have only intensified, leaving little room for peace, prosperity, and progress for the region’s two billion people.
Pakistan, on principle, has consistently resisted Indian dominance in South Asia. The seeds of rivalry between India and Pakistan were sown during the uneven partition of India, which ultimately gave rise to the Kashmir issue. It is ironic that India was the country that first approached the UN for a settlement of the Kashmir issue and agreed to a UN-led plebiscite, yet has made no real progress towards that goal. As noted by renowned Pakistani diplomat Zamir Akram, Indian leaders tend to choose negotiations only when they feel pressured by great powers or see potential gains. For example, the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks in 1962, following the Sino-Indian war, occurred when India, fearing a two-front war, sought US President Kennedy’s pressure on Pakistan to stay out of the conflict with China and offered peace talks on Kashmir. However, once the pressure eased, India backtracked, and Pakistan lost a golden opportunity in Kashmir.
The Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 are further reflections of India’s mindset towards Pakistan. Despite internal errors, various intelligence reports indicate that India supported anti-Pakistan sentiments in East Pakistan as early as 1952. Many Awami League leaders received instructions from the Indian establishment, which was intent on dividing Jinnah’s Pakistan. The direct involvement of Indian troops from 3 December to 16 December 1971 led to Pakistan’s disintegration. However, through his diplomacy and statecraft, President Bhutto restored Pakistan’s sovereignty and pride at the negotiating table in the Simla Agreement (July 1972).
From the Simla Agreement to the Lahore Declaration, some misguided liberals on both sides falsely believed that the Indian establishment was serious about peace and progress in South Asia, particularly in ending its rivalry with Pakistan. This belief persisted despite the rise of Hindu hardliner Modi to power in Delhi.
Regarding the Kashmir issue, many mistakenly believe that India revoked Kashmir’s special status by scrapping Articles 35A and 370 on 5 August 2019. However, historians argue that the special status of Indian-occupied Kashmir was effectively diluted when Prime Minister Nehru arrested the infamous leader Sheikh Abdullah in 1953. Since then, the Indian establishment has ruled IOK through puppet leaders and governor’s rule, leaving no space for genuine democracy and the rule of law. The popular uprising of the 1990s against Indian rule resulted in the deaths of thousands of Kashmiris and the mass disappearance of Kashmiri youth from the valley. Yet, these tactics have not quelled the Kashmiri demand for self-determination. It is also not surprising that despite Kashmir’s clear Muslim majority, most of the civil and military apparatus in IOK remains predominantly Hindu and non-Kashmiri.
Under Modi’s leadership, India has tightened its control over Kashmir, removing even the nominal guarantees that had existed. Because of Western fears of China, particularly in the USA, India is viewed as a net security provider and strategic partner, leading many so-called human rights champions to remain silent on the atrocities in IOK. Beyond Kashmir, Modi’s leadership has marginalized Indian Muslims in politics, economics, civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the army, as documented by French Professor Christophe Jaffrelot in his seminal book “Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy” (2021).
Modi’s approach has been anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan since 2014. From the Uri attack (2016) to the Pulwama attack (2019) and the Balakot airstrike (26 February 2019), India has sought to establish its dominance over Pakistan through military means, a strategy that bodes ill for peace in South Asia. In doing so, the Indian establishment aims to subvert Pakistan, as it has done to other smaller South Asian states. Apart from military means, India has used economic coercion, cyber-attacks, and diplomacy to defame and damage Pakistan before the international community.
Despite holding out an olive branch to India’s NDA government to secure peace and normalization, Pakistan’s efforts have been met with India’s old mantra of cross-border terrorism, avoiding genuine negotiations on the Kashmir issue.
These historical and recent developments reflect India’s overarching goal of establishing dominance and hegemony in South Asia. Regarding Pakistan, the Indian establishment under Modi has pursued an anti-Pakistan and isolationist policy, leaving no room for dialogue and diplomacy on the Kashmir issue. Normalization with India and the resumption of trade seem unrealistic in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Pakistan must focus on political stability, economic cooperation with neighbouring countries (other than India), and invest in human capital and soft power. Only then can Pakistan engage with India on core issues from a position of strength.
Sher Ali Bukhari
The writer is a UET alumni with keen interest in Pakistan’s foreign policy.
