Terrorists or Khawarij

Exploring the shift from “terrorist” to “Khawarij,” this piece examines the implications for understanding political violence and sectarian divides in contemporary Islam.

This piece may be read as a sequel to my last published article on the subject in January 2023 titled “Terrorism Redux in Pakistan”. Recently, the use of the word “Khawarij / Kharijites” has more frequently been used instead of “Terrorist”; some readers and friends asked for the reasons for this change of name, and that prompted me to briefly explore the subject. According to Oxford Bibliographies Research, The Kharijites (Arabic: khawarij; sing. khariji) were the first identifiable sect of Islam. Their identity emerged as some followers of Holy Prophet Muhammad PBUH attempted to determine the extent to which one could deviate from ideal norms of behaviour and still be called Muslim. The extreme Kharijite position was that Muslims who commit grave sins effectively reject their religion, entering the ranks of apostates, and therefore deserve capital punishment. This position was considered excessively restrictive by the majority of Muslims, as well as by moderate Kharijites, who held that a professed Muslim could not be declared an unbeliever (kafir). The Kharijites believed it was forbidden to live among those who did not share their views, thus acquiring the name by which they are known in mainstream Islamic historiography—khawarij means “seceders” or “those who exit the community.” Radical Kharijites, on the other hand, declared those who disagreed with their position to be apostates, and they launched periodic military attacks against mainstream Muslim centers until they ceased to be a military threat in the late 8th century CE. The Kharijites were also known as Haruriyah (from Harura, the site of one of their main camps in Iraq), and more generically as ghulat (extremists).

Hazrat Umar ibn al-Khattab was the second Rashidun Caliph, ruling from August 634, when he succeeded Abu Bakr (CE 632–634), until his assassination in 644, by an enslaved Persian Christian named Abū Luʾluʾah. However, the specific context for the emergence of the Kharijites was the struggle for leadership of the Muslim community following the martyrdom of the third caliph, Hazrat ʿUthman (RA) in 656 CE by the Egyptian rebels/ khawarij. The community leaders chose Holy Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) cousin and son-in-law, Hazrat ʿAli ibn Abi Talib (RA) as Hazrat ʿUthman successor. Hazrat ‘Ali had broad support based upon his reputation for piety, wisdom, and courage. Some supported him because he was Holy Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) closest surviving male relative. Hazrat Muʿawiyah (RA), the governor of Damascus, however, rebelled against Hazrat ʿAli’s leadership. In a battle at Siffin (in modern Syria) in 657 CE (First Fitna), Hazrat ʿAli’s troops were poised to defeat Hazrat Muʿawiyah forces when the latter sought arbitration. Hazrat ʿAli agreed, whereupon some of his supporters turned against him. Believing Muʿawiyah and his supporters had apostatized through their rebellion, some held that Hazrat ʿAli was duty-bound to fight them, and that his victory had been divinely ordained. The agreement to arbitrate was thus a violation of the divine will, rendering Hazrat ʿAli and his supporters apostates as well. This faction—the Kharijites—continued to fight against Hazrat ʿAli’s troops, and ʿAli was eventually assassinated by a Kharijite in 661 CE. Although radical Kharijites were eventually defeated by the caliph’s forces and virtually disappeared in urban areas, some moderate Kharijite groups survived, particularly in rural and tribal areas, where they continue to exist today. In addition, the radical Kharijite legacy has been revived in the context of late 20th-century terrorist activities by some Muslim groups. Crone 2006 and Salem 1956 provide the best overviews of Kharijite history and ideology. Kenney 2006 characterizes the Kharijites as political rebels and therefore forerunners of contemporary militant movements.

Hopefully, that shall suffice to understand the divisive, disputed but self-destructive part of the political history of Islam and the background associated with Khawarij/ Kharijites. Since the term Khawarij is indicative of the Muslim World’s greatest political/ sectarian fault line that has kept the Muslims divided, the sense of replacing the globally accepted and all-encompassing term “Terrorists” by “Khawarij” is perplexing. It goes without saying the term “terrorist/ terrorism” has also undergone a maturity and general acceptance period of at least 20 years, especially in the background of the controversial 9/11 incidents in the USA. Still, the West and other foes of Islam tend to selectively use the term “terrorist/terrorism” in relation to retaliatory acts of militancy by Muslims only; therefore, why give them another widely forgotten sectarian term to more convincingly associate terrorism with Islam only and to sprinkle fresh salt on the old wounds and exploit it in multiple ways? On the other hand, the proscribed terrorists’ outfits operating in Pakistan maliciously wearing cloaks and masks of insurgents and political rebels, may find it even more advantageous to explore and link with old sectarian ideologies, despite the fact that they are just the hired guns in the hands of a mix of Pakistan’s foes targeting Pakistan from three directions externally, and from all directions internally with less to do with the religion or sects and more to do with bigger anti-Pakistan agendas. Hence, instead of unduly domesticating the historically divisive fault-line by the use of the word “Khawarij” for obvious snags, the continued use of the word “terrorists” is considered more appropriate for global acceptance. After all brave Pakistan Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan have successfully fought a most costly “War against Terrorism” since 2001; far more gallantly than any other country or coalition.

Worthy readers may like to revisit “Redux of Terrorism in Pakistan” to understand the dynamics of unabated terrorism in Pakistan and what to do about it. While military actions have played a significant role in combating terrorism, the complexities of this issue make it clear that no single approach can effectively eradicate it. It is well established that Pakistan is the target of malicious fifth-generation warfare; and terrorism is a multifaceted problem, influenced by political, social, economic, and ideological factors, which are exploited easily by the foes in a country faced with critical political instability, economic crisis and weaker internal security front with disenchanted masses. What is really needed is a comprehensive, multifaceted approach that integrates various strategies and resources to deal with terrorism’s root causes, prevent its spread, and manage its long-term impacts. An all-inclusive strategy that includes international cooperation, ideological counter-narratives, economic development, education, diplomacy, and public engagement is essential to effectively defeat the scourge of terrorism in the long term.

Saleem Qamar Butt
The writer is a retired senior army officer with experience in international relations, military diplomacy and analysis of geo-political and strategic security issues.

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