Tariq Osman Hyder After two years the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and India met in Islamabad on 15th July. Since the Mumbai tragedy in November 2008 the peace process dialogue begun in January 2004 had been frozen by India. At the SAARC Summit in Bhutan both democratically elected Prime Ministers agreed their Foreign Ministers would meet to chart the way forward and discuss all issues. Both governments and peoples are now grappling with the aftermath on the day after. What took place; what is the outcome; was it expected; were the Foreign Ministers well prepared, supported or constrained by their bureaucracies; what comes next; what lessons can be learnt. Both Ministers elaborated their positions and expectations. The Indian Minister concentrated on terrorism. The Pakistani Minister reiterated that Pakistan would not allow its soil to be used against India, and conveyed deep concern at Indian destabilisation activities through Afghanistan into FATA and Balochistan. Hafiz Saeed, whatever he said, was not an official unlike the Indian Home Secretary who just before the talks had made an irresponsible statement alleging ISI involvement in the Mumbai attack. Responding to Indian claims of infiltration across the Line of Control he declared government policy was to prevent infiltration. India should address the continuing human rights violations again igniting discontent in Kashmir. The Indian proposal to restart Kashmir negotiations along their preferred Musharraf model met the response that till the entire dialogue process was recommenced such talks would not resume, the back channel could only work in tandem with the front channel. Substance was not expected as this meeting was an exercise on how to proceed. As obvious from the Foreign Ministers joint press conference the scope of agreement was limited. No clear structure or timetable emerged. The only agreement was on the dialogues continuation, that information to counter terrorism be exchanged through diplomatic channels and that the Foreign Ministers meet in Delhi later this year. Hence both Foreign Ministers could claim there was no deadlock, each better understood the others position, and despite differences the window of opportunity could lead to better relations. Few observers expected otherwise though many hoped more would ensue to smooth the oft-troubled relationship between the nuclear neighbours. There has been much discussion and criticism by the media and opposition in both countries on the performance and preparation of their Foreign Ministers, as evidenced by the joint press conference. It was clear from the press conference that both Foreign Ministers were tired and not at their best. Diplomats are the marathon men, the endurance runners of negotiations, used to intense rounds lasting days, weeks or years. Politicians, including Foreign Ministers, are sprint experts, to whom the baton is passed for the final effort. Since adequate preparation was not possible, the intensity of the talks coupled with unmet expectation of both Ministers took its toll. An accurate appreciation would be that both Foreign Ministers followed their national briefs. However, the Pakistani Minister went into the meeting backed by thorough Foreign Office preparation and a political consensus. The Indian Foreign Minister was apparently inclined towards his Prime Ministers mandate in informal discussions preceding the talks but was pulled back by the powerful Indian bureaucracy. The controversy about telephone calls during the talks was unnecessary. If a point had to be made it should have been that the mandate of the Indian Prime Minister was limited by the South Block mandarins flanking the Foreign Minister, their Foreign Secretary and High Commissioner, in frequent communication presumably with their National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. Before the talks the Pakistan Foreign Minister had clarified that though he was ready to drop, in deference to Indian susceptibilities, the term the composite dialogue which had defined the eight segment process, it was essential that all the subjects be discussed in an integrated manner in any future bilateral dialogue. This core Pakistani position remained intact during the talks. Pakistan, consistent with its position had an indicative timetable to discuss all issues before reviews at Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister levels by year end, as per past practice. For India this was too ambitious. Its emphasis on tackling terrorism reinforced by real-time instructions from Delhi provided its Foreign Minister with a brake. He was open to discussing all issues but in a gradual manner, beginning with some issues to enhance trust before moving onto others. Had Pakistans Foreign Minister agreed to this piecemeal approach, India would have put Pakistans core concerns, including Kashmir and the waters issue, on the back burner; concentrated for the foreseeable future on terrorism; kept in play its preferred soft subjects of trade and people-to-people contacts; while reassuring the international community it was doing everything possible to improve relations with a recalcitrant Pakistan. So where do both countries go from here? Relations are not at an impasse which is something, but progress will be slow and incremental, which is not what their peoples deserve. Better groundwork is required before the next round which will be up to the Foreign Secretaries given political will on both sides. This time it had reportedly been mutually agreed before the talks that no joint communiqu would be issued. This needs to be rethought. For instance, after this round a short statement stating what had been agreed and what needed more discussion would have reduced pressure on the Foreign Ministers and transparently summed up the outcome. India, the larger country with an expanding economy, oversized military and global ambitions, bolstered by strategic partnership with America, feels it can take the high road with Pakistan, ignoring the reality that bad relations with its neighbour inevitably impact on its global image and role and waste scarce resources better utilised to mitigate endemic poverty. A peace dividend would benefit both countries. For Pakistan there are three main lessons. It must hand over to India, and share with its own public and friends, the detailed evidence that it certainly has on Indian destabilisation through Afghanistan and elsewhere including that already handed over in meetings of the Home Secretaries and some of which was initially provided as far back as March 2007 during the first meeting of the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism. At that meeting evidence provided to the Indian side showed a systematic attempt by Indian agencies to destabilise Pakistan through instigating terrorists and terrorist acts and propagating anti-state propaganda: inter alia a dossier was handed over identifying a member of an Indian Consulate in Afghanistan who had recruited a named and intercepted tribesman to be a suicide bomber to attempt to assassinate the US Ambassador in Kabul in order to implicate Pakistan. Another dossier included a periodic magazine printed in India to encourage secession in Sindh. Intelligence agencies everywhere tend to be wary of disclosing information as it would compromise their sources. However considering Indias propaganda campaign to put Pakistan on the back foot, it is high time Pakistan disclosed whatever evidence and information it has. Pakistan must improve its governance, internal security and economy which would bring India back to the negotiating table. Equally important the talks served as a stark reminder and corrective to Pakistans political leadership that Indias hard edged diplomacy and hawkish bureaucracy cannot be countered by politesse, urbanity or defensiveness, which is viewed as weakness. The writer is a retired ambassador and headed Pakistans delegations to the Nuclear and Conventional CBMs talks and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism with India from 2004-2007.