As the war in Gaza nears its one-year mark, Israel’s goal of decimating Hamas remains elusive. Despite its military preparedness and technological superiority, bolstered by support from the United States and Europe, Israel has been unable to achieve the total victory envisioned by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Efforts by the U.S., Egypt, Qatar, and other nations to broker a ceasefire in exchange for Israeli hostages have stalled, with little progress beyond statements from world leaders. Politics appears to have overshadowed this already complex issue, which involves occupation, the fight for freedom, terrorism, religion, personal agendas, and more. The following is an attempt to untangle this web by examining the competing viewpoints of the various parties involved and what may lie ahead in this ongoing human tragedy.
From Israel’s perspective, it has successfully destroyed or seized critical supply routes from Egypt to Gaza, including the key Philadelphi Corridor, a 300-foot-wide, eight-mile-long strip from Israel’s border to the Mediterranean. This corridor, which connects Gaza to the northeast and Egypt to the southwest, was a vital supply route for weapons and food transportation to Hamas. Israel claims to have killed or captured approximately 14,000 combatants in Gaza and eliminated half the leadership of the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, including figures like Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assert they can now move freely throughout Gaza, claiming that Hamas is so weakened that it has reportedly informed international negotiators of its willingness to relinquish civilian control of Gaza after a ceasefire.
However, Israel believes that if it withdraws from Gaza now, Hamas could regroup and regain strength within a year. Israeli military officials estimate that another two to three months of intense fighting in central and southern Gaza will be necessary before transitioning to intelligence-based raids and strikes over the next year. This strategy aims to eliminate remaining Hamas fighters and dismantle their weapons infrastructure before allowing another party to assume administrative control of Gaza. The U.S. assessment suggests that Hamas is no longer capable of orchestrating attacks on the scale of those seen on October 7, and its ability to launch smaller terrorist strikes is in question. However, American officials caution that Hamas may reconstitute itself after Israeli forces leave an area, particularly if there is no clear follow-up plan for governance and security.
Israel understands that the return of approximately 115 hostages, whether alive or dead, can only be secured through negotiations.
Hamas, from the outset, has pursued a strategy of “survival as victory.” It has instructed its fighters to hide within its extensive tunnel network beneath Gaza or among the civilian population. While Israel has tried to target these tunnels, the underground network has proved more extensive than anticipated, allowing Hamas leaders and fighters to evade capture. Hamas claims that Israeli forces are exhausted and eager for an end to the conflict, and believes that continued fighting will lead to more civilian casualties, increasing global opposition to Israel while generating support for the Palestinian cause.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has formed security and economic coalitions to contain Russia in Europe, China in the Pacific, and to isolate Iran in the Middle East. These coalitions extend from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in Asia-Pacific to India in the Persian Gulf and NATO in Europe. A proposed defense alliance with Saudi Arabia is key to linking these alliances. However, for the U.S. Congress to approve a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, the olive branch would be the normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. In return, Saudi Arabia would require a ceasefire in Gaza and a commitment to a two-state solution leading to a Palestinian state in the future. A ceasefire deal with Hamas, coupled with the release of Israeli hostages, could also compel Hezbollah to cease hostilities. At that point, Israel could begin negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, paving the way for normalised relations with Saudi Arabia—a significant diplomatic victory for both the U.S. and Israel. This would potentially open the door for Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco to send peacekeeping forces to Gaza, with the Palestinian Authority representing the Palestinian people rather than Hamas. Such a coalition could counter Iran’s alliances with Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias.
However, this diplomatic scenario faces hurdles. Prime Minister Netanyahu, indicted in 2019 on charges of fraud, bribery, and breach of trust, is motivated to stay in power to avoid prison if convicted. His government relies on a fragile coalition with far-right Jewish supremacists who oppose a two-state solution and threaten to topple his government if he agrees to a ceasefire or a deal with Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu has historically undermined the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, criticising its incompetence and corruption, even though it recognised Israel and signed the Oslo Accords. He has allowed Hamas to strengthen in Gaza as a means to keep the Palestinian people divided, even permitting Qatar to send $1 billion to Hamas for humanitarian aid and salaries.
Netanyahu is aware that the younger Democratic base in the U.S. is increasingly critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza. Thus, a Democratic victory in the upcoming U.S. elections would not align with his interests. If Netanyahu refuses to agree to a ceasefire and a hostage deal, this would place U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris in a difficult position, forcing her either to criticise Netanyahu and risk losing Jewish support, or to remain silent and lose Arab backing—both of which could harm her in the eyes of American voters. On the other hand, former President Donald Trump supports Netanyahu’s hardline approach in Gaza. A Trump victory in the 2024 U.S. elections would align with Netanyahu’s goals. If Trump wins, Netanyahu could announce a ceasefire, the return of hostages, and a Saudi deal, declaring it a victory for Israel, which could secure his re-election without needing the support of right-wing coalition partners.
In a broader context, Netanyahu sees an alliance with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations as a diplomatic milestone, creating an Israeli-Arab partnership against Iran’s regional influence. However, this alliance would be incomplete without Pakistan, which holds one of the world’s most powerful militaries and is the only nuclear-armed Islamic country. Pakistan’s ailing economy, dependent on financial support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Western lenders, might pressure it into joining the coalition, provided there is a path to Palestinian statehood and relief from its mounting foreign debt. But Pakistan faces a difficult choice, as its population has long viewed Israel as an occupying force. The possibility of Pakistan recognising Israel—something unthinkable for nearly eight decades—would be a monumental shift. The question remains whether Pakistan will join the Israel-Saudi alliance, and if Israel will deem the Saudi deal complete without Pakistan’s involvement.
The solution to the war in Gaza and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far more complex than the immediate dynamics between Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The multitude of competing interests, extending far beyond the Middle East, must align before there is any hope of lasting peace in the region and the world.
Haroon Khawaja
The writer is a former advisor to the Prime Minister and Chief Minister of Punjab and an economic expert. He can be reached at:
hkhil@usa.net.
