The constitution is a living document, an instrument that makes the government system work. Its flexibility lies in its amendments. The democratic credentials of a government are judged not only by its ability to function within the constitutional framework but also, and more importantly, by the importance it attaches to public interest legislation as against initiatives aimed at strengthening the state apparatus, especially its coercive powers.
In 2010, after destabilising each other for decades, the Bhuttos and Sharifs joined hands to add Article 63A to the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, through the 18th Amendment. The Article threatens the loss of membership in the National Assembly to any legislator disobeying the party head’s direction relating to the removal of the PM. Thus, Article 63A further entrenches their hegemony and that of the related non-democratic culture within the political parties.
The drafters of Article 63A justified its inclusion into the constitution to safeguard democracy against influence over legislators and eliminate bribery. The bribery considerations were sincere since a few legislators demanded vast amounts of money to switch parties and cast votes, undermining party discipline. The pre-Article 63A political culture was corrupt and unruly, detrimental to political stability. Party heads spent most of their resources on “horse-trading” rather than crafting legislation for the people’s welfare. Unfortunately, Article 63A has failed to modify political behaviors. Though highly pietistic in rhetoric, the political culture of Pakistan is thoroughly corrupt and lawless. As before, some legislators continue to engage in corruption in secret votes in violation of the party platform.
It is a matter of extreme regret that horse-trading has been a bane of politics in Pakistan. This evil has led to the failure of various governments since the creation of the country. In the recent past, this trend has been on the increase which is a matter of great concern for all of us. The remedy, however, lies with the Members of the Assemblies themselves and those elected by them. Such practices undermine the democratic norms and constitutional functioning and must be deplored. The practices like horse-trading, exertion of undue pressure on the members, and interference in the right to vote freely are not only abhorring but are unconstitutional.
Since the legislators vote on a no-confidence resolution in the open without any confidentiality, party heads would know which legislators disobey them. Article 63A empowers the them to initiate a disqualification proceeding against a defecting legislator. In so doing, the Article promotes a non-democratic pathos within political parties, strengthening the head’s autocratic powers, forcing legislators to cast votes on a no-confidence resolution per dictation, disregarding their conscience and sentiments of the constituents.
There is no gainsaying that the boundaries between the jurisdiction of courts and parliamentary independence have been contested for a long time. However, there is a need and requirement for recognising institutional comity and separation of powers to tailor judicial interference in the democratic processes only as a last resort. Currently, the situation pertains to one such situation, wherein the Supreme Court (SC) is called upon to adjudicate and maintain democratic values and facilitate the fostering of the citizens’ right to good governance. The SC must be cognizant of the need to take into consideration the competing claims of the parties, uphold democratic values and foster constitutional morality. Being the sentinel on the qui vive of the constitution, it is under obligation to see that the democracy prevails and does not get hollowed by individuals.
In an accountable democracy, elected legislators vote on a no-confidence resolution according to their conscience and the wishes of the people who elected them. Unfortunately, a small minority of legislators have been defecting from parties for various reasons, including bribery, opportunism, and political revenge. However, disqualifying a defector in a no-confidence resolution is a clumsy solution that does more harm than good. It corrupts the integrity of the parliamentary proceedings and interferes with a no-confidence resolution as a legislative matter. It appears the wrangling over Article 63A will eventually land in the SC because PM Khan vows to fight at all fronts. Given the non-democratic implications of Article 63A, the SC is likely to interpret its provisions supporting representative democracy rather than upholding the hegemony of party heads. The court is unlikely to enforce the head’s command to deny the defectors the right to assembly or vote in a no-confidence resolution. It is unpredictable whether the court will mitigate the disqualification punishment for defection.
No prime minister in Pakistan’s history has been removed through a no-confidence vote. Such motions have been tabled against two leaders of the house before this. In 2006, former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz survived a no-confidence move against him. The first no-confidence motion against a sitting prime minister came in 1989, against then prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who survived the vote. Former speaker of the National Assembly Chaudhry Amir Hussain was the target of two no-confidence motions in June 2003 and October 2004 against him and survived both. In June 2003, a motion against him fell through as opposition members boycotted the voting after taking part in the debate. For a vote of no-confidence against the prime minister, at least 20 percent of the total MNAs, which means 68 members, have to sign a resolution for it to be voted on. From the day the resolution is moved, it “shall not be voted upon before the expiry of three days, or later than seven days,” according to Rule no.37(6) of the National Assembly Rules of procedure 2007. According to the Constitution, if a no-trust resolution against the Prime Minister is passed by a majority of the total membership of the lower house, the prime minister ceases to hold office., then as per rule no.32 (1) of the National Assembly Rules of procedure 2007: “Whenever the office of the Prime Minister is vacant for any reason, the Assembly shall, to the exclusion of any other business proceed to elect without debate one of its member to be the Prime Minister”. The outcome of the vote will be consequential either way. The political uncertainty borne of such a move will not be without implications for a fragile economy.
In 2010, after destabilising each other for decades, the Bhuttos and Sharifs joined hands to add Article 63A to the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, through the 18th Amendment. The Article threatens the loss of membership in the National Assembly to any legislator disobeying the party head’s direction relating to the removal of the PM. Thus, Article 63A further entrenches their hegemony and that of the related non-democratic culture within the political parties.
The drafters of Article 63A justified its inclusion into the constitution to safeguard democracy against influence over legislators and eliminate bribery. The bribery considerations were sincere since a few legislators demanded vast amounts of money to switch parties and cast votes, undermining party discipline. The pre-Article 63A political culture was corrupt and unruly, detrimental to political stability. Party heads spent most of their resources on “horse-trading” rather than crafting legislation for the people’s welfare. Unfortunately, Article 63A has failed to modify political behaviors. Though highly pietistic in rhetoric, the political culture of Pakistan is thoroughly corrupt and lawless. As before, some legislators continue to engage in corruption in secret votes in violation of the party platform.
It is a matter of extreme regret that horse-trading has been a bane of politics in Pakistan. This evil has led to the failure of various governments since the creation of the country. In the recent past, this trend has been on the increase which is a matter of great concern for all of us. The remedy, however, lies with the Members of the Assemblies themselves and those elected by them. Such practices undermine the democratic norms and constitutional functioning and must be deplored. The practices like horse-trading, exertion of undue pressure on the members, and interference in the right to vote freely are not only abhorring but are unconstitutional.
Since the legislators vote on a no-confidence resolution in the open without any confidentiality, party heads would know which legislators disobey them. Article 63A empowers the them to initiate a disqualification proceeding against a defecting legislator. In so doing, the Article promotes a non-democratic pathos within political parties, strengthening the head’s autocratic powers, forcing legislators to cast votes on a no-confidence resolution per dictation, disregarding their conscience and sentiments of the constituents.
There is no gainsaying that the boundaries between the jurisdiction of courts and parliamentary independence have been contested for a long time. However, there is a need and requirement for recognising institutional comity and separation of powers to tailor judicial interference in the democratic processes only as a last resort. Currently, the situation pertains to one such situation, wherein the Supreme Court (SC) is called upon to adjudicate and maintain democratic values and facilitate the fostering of the citizens’ right to good governance. The SC must be cognizant of the need to take into consideration the competing claims of the parties, uphold democratic values and foster constitutional morality. Being the sentinel on the qui vive of the constitution, it is under obligation to see that the democracy prevails and does not get hollowed by individuals.
In an accountable democracy, elected legislators vote on a no-confidence resolution according to their conscience and the wishes of the people who elected them. Unfortunately, a small minority of legislators have been defecting from parties for various reasons, including bribery, opportunism, and political revenge. However, disqualifying a defector in a no-confidence resolution is a clumsy solution that does more harm than good. It corrupts the integrity of the parliamentary proceedings and interferes with a no-confidence resolution as a legislative matter. It appears the wrangling over Article 63A will eventually land in the SC because PM Khan vows to fight at all fronts. Given the non-democratic implications of Article 63A, the SC is likely to interpret its provisions supporting representative democracy rather than upholding the hegemony of party heads. The court is unlikely to enforce the head’s command to deny the defectors the right to assembly or vote in a no-confidence resolution. It is unpredictable whether the court will mitigate the disqualification punishment for defection.
No prime minister in Pakistan’s history has been removed through a no-confidence vote. Such motions have been tabled against two leaders of the house before this. In 2006, former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz survived a no-confidence move against him. The first no-confidence motion against a sitting prime minister came in 1989, against then prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who survived the vote. Former speaker of the National Assembly Chaudhry Amir Hussain was the target of two no-confidence motions in June 2003 and October 2004 against him and survived both. In June 2003, a motion against him fell through as opposition members boycotted the voting after taking part in the debate. For a vote of no-confidence against the prime minister, at least 20 percent of the total MNAs, which means 68 members, have to sign a resolution for it to be voted on. From the day the resolution is moved, it “shall not be voted upon before the expiry of three days, or later than seven days,” according to Rule no.37(6) of the National Assembly Rules of procedure 2007. According to the Constitution, if a no-trust resolution against the Prime Minister is passed by a majority of the total membership of the lower house, the prime minister ceases to hold office., then as per rule no.32 (1) of the National Assembly Rules of procedure 2007: “Whenever the office of the Prime Minister is vacant for any reason, the Assembly shall, to the exclusion of any other business proceed to elect without debate one of its member to be the Prime Minister”. The outcome of the vote will be consequential either way. The political uncertainty borne of such a move will not be without implications for a fragile economy.
