As the tense, nay hostile, Indo-Pakistan relations have worsened over the years, instead of changing for the better, the conclusion of The Wall Street Journal that Islamabad has shifted its focus from the eastern neighbour to militancy and the floods, is off the mark. Pakistan Army sources have not minced their words, debunking the WSJ story. The militants might be posing a grave threat to the security and stability of the country and the unprecedented floods might have created a crisis of unimaginable proportions, but both are of the nature of an internal phenomenon that would, no doubt, entail hard work and time to tackle. However, New Delhis designs fall into a completely different category. Therein lies an existential threat to Pakistan that India has ceaselessly kept alive since the day the partition plan was agreed to by all parties to the independence of British India. Its manoeuvrings played no insignificant role in cutting the country asunder in two parts. And, as questioned by a security official, what has India done, politically and militarily, for this threat to have been reduced? Rather, it has increased that threat, both in the conventional and unconventional sense, by using its presence in Afghanistan to muddy the waters for Pakistan, both in FATA and Balochistan. Its keenness to firm up its stay in Afghanistan, to which it has no direct land access, could not be divorced from its intention to encircle Pakistan. The security official used, more or less, the words of COAS General Kayani when he said, the configuration of any defence force is based on enemy capabilities and not intentions. With Kashmir and other disputes remaining unresolved, Indias baseless accusation of Pakistans role in the Mumbai attacks and declared intention of acting against Pakistan in case of another similar incident, is hardly the scenario in which Islamabad could drop its guard. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has said that India wants to have friendly relations with all neighbours, would have to settle Kashmir in line with the relevant UN resolutions and other disputes. A mere faade of talks without getting down to brass tacks about resolving this core issue would be a subterfuge for the world, but would not succeed in normalisation relations with Pakistan. That dispute also comes in the way of improving its ties with China, which has rightly refused to grant a visa to Lt-General B. S. Jaswal because his command covers the disputed state. If the Indians want to create a 'peaceful and tranquil international environment they would have to rethink their policies towards both Pakistan and China. Hegemonic ambitions backed by military strength can compel weaker neighbours into submission, but it would have to accept the relationship of sovereign equality with the two nuclear powers and that too must be preceded by the resolution of disputes with them.