As I have read press reports of the US offering massive incentives to Israel in an effort to secure a three month settlement freeze, I wanted to give the US peace negotiators the benefit of the doubt. On too many levels, however, Im having trouble understanding the logic behind all of this. First of all, I have a problem with the very idea that we are negotiating with the Israelis on the terms of a settlement freeze. If settlement construction is illegitimate then what are we talking about? There was some hope early on when President Barack Obama stated that settlement activity must end, and this was then echoed and amplified by Secretary Clinton making it clear that the President meant all construction. But when Israel dispatched Defence Minister Ehud Barak to Washington to negotiate terms and the US, instead of sending him home, began a long and involved discussion with the Israelis, hope began to fade. What ensued was a year and a half of mixed signals and meandering - which continues until today. On the one hand, the US insists that settlement construction is wrong, but then argues that the existing settlements are accepted realities. The Israelis arent fools. They know that if they build, there will be complaints. But they also know that they can weather this storm, and when they do (as they have in the past), what they have build they can keep. They have been at this game for 40+ years and know that if they manoeuvre and buy time, they will win. I also dont understand the logic behind a three month one-time-only renewal of a freeze. Unless the administration has a trick up their sleeves and are supremely confident that they can work magic in 90 days, this freeze will end, and the Israelis will declare that their obligation has also ended. I suppose that the assumption here is that in the next three months an agreement can be reached on borders, including what the Israelis call Jerusalem (which it must always be remembered includes not just the Holy City, but their land grab of large swatches of the West Bank to the north, east and south of the city). The idea appears to be that the Israelis will accept borders that encapsulate the major settlements they have already built (something which the US appears to have accepted) with land around them allowing for natural growth and the Palestinians will then accept this fait accompli. Within these accepted borders construction will be allowed, while negotiations on other issues continue. Since the same hardliners in Netanyahus government, who do not accept a limited freeze, are even more opposed to returning land to the Palestinians, and since the Palestinians most likely will not be able to easily accept the borders that Israel may offer, this entire approach, I fear, is less a trick up their sleeves and more a risky pipedream. It also makes no sense that the US is offering incentives, on a grand scale, to Israel for a mere three month freeze. The logic here is that Prime Minister Netanyahu needs this to convince his government to accept the terms of a freeze. But his government is itself the problem. He could, if he were truly committed to a negotiated peace agreement, form a different and broader coalition government with other parties. But it is his insistence on maintaining the hardline anti-peace coalition that has created the current impasse. This is not how Bush and Baker dealt with Shamir in 1991-2, or how Clinton dealt with Netanyahu in 1998. In both of those cases, US pressure helped force a change in Israel. In this instance, however, we are rewarding Netanyahus intransigence and supporting his hardline coalition. By any measure, this is establishing a dangerous precedent, with troubling consequences down the road. If the Israeli Prime Minister cannot get his coalition to agree to stop building illegitimate settlements without huge US incentives, how will he get them to agree (and how much more will it cost the US to get them to agree) to any reasonable withdrawal from the occupied lands? So is the logic here that Israel will go through this agonising internal debate (sweetened with incentives) to agree to stop doing what they should not have been doing all along, and then put the ball in the Palestinian court, forcing them to accept what they were never a party to in the first place, or appear to be the spoilers? And what about the Palestinians? What troubles me most in all of this is the degree to which the US has inserted itself in the negotiating process not on behalf of the Palestinians, but instead of the Palestinians. I have real reservations about the extent to which some of the recent statements made by the American officials, and some of the reported incentives the US appears to have offered to the Israelis, give away the store and limit Palestinian flexibility and leverage. By appearing to agree to Israels demand that they keep settlement blocs and maintain a security presence in the Jordan Valley, the US risks weighing in on two critical final status issues in a manner that predetermines their outcome. And by agreeing to block any Palestinian effort to go to the United Nations as a court of last resort, the US has further constrained Palestinian options. Since it is my understanding that these matters have not been agreed to, or even discussed with the Palestinians or other Arab leaders, one can only imagine their consternation and loss of confidence, as they witness this unfolding affair. What, then, is the logic? The writer is the president of the Arab American Institute, Washington DC.