Geopolitical environment of the Indian Ocean region remains in a state of flux owing to numerous conflicts, crises and developing situations. Intensifying Iran-Israel hostility, simmering Palestine-Israel conflict, Syrian imbroglio, Yemen crisis and Afghanistan’s uncertain future are some of the markers of today’s regional instability. Cumulatively, this has attracted many extra regional stakeholders in the region, to safeguard their national and allies’ interests. Robert Kaplan, in his work ‘Monsoon’ published 2011, predicted an unstable Indian Ocean owing largely to American attempt to contain Iran and terrorism while India-China interlocking just as Sino-America rivalry was bound to emerge in the Pacific. Due to these politico-strategic currents, the North Arabian Sea seems to be an area of immense naval activity, whereby roughly 15-25 warships are always present on a given day. Of late, the US navy has deployed two carrier battle groups with an impending Irani counter strike against Israel.

The Red Sea, a critical conduit for 30% of the world’s container traffic, is currently facing a shipping crisis of unprecedented scale. In response to Houthi attacks against merchant ships passing through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, significant traffic has been diverted from the region to the Cape of Good Hope. According to a World Bank report, titled ‘Navigating troubled waters’ published on 16 May, 2024, the Cape has seen 100% increase in navigation. And those still passing through the embattled maritime zones end up paying hefty surcharges and insurance premiums. The ships taking a diverted route suffer from time delays and falling short on meeting shipment deadlines. This precarious situation, which demands a through continuity of maritime commerce while remaining ready to thwart threats originating from land to sea or from sea to land, is something putting an increasing burden on the navies, especially on those states whose economic lifeline greatly depends on the maritime trade.

Of Pakistan’s total trade, 95% is sea-borne. This means any disruption, interruption or delays in the commerce through sea would have grave effect on Pakistan’s economy. In the oil imports, for instance, 10-12 oil tankers carrying 75,000 tons’ cargo, come and go at Pakistan ports within a week, to contribute to our overall national oil consumption of about 400,000 barrels a day. Additionally, 2-3 LNG carriers per week dock at Cape Monze and Port Qasim to fulfill our energy needs. Pakistan’s power sector depends nearly 30% on fossil fuel. In a scenario when such supplies are stopped, the entire country along with its energy-dependent businesses could come to a grinding halt.

Most of our oil and LNG comes from the Gulf nations, passing through the Strait of Hormuz, laying astride perilously close to Iran. As a consequence of Russo-Ukraine war, EU imports significant amount of LNG from the Gulf, and in 2023, Qatar exported 19% of its total LNG to EU alone. In a scenario, should Iran choose to conduct a military operation close to this choke point, as it did against MV Pacific Gold on 4 January 2024, it would create a catastrophic impact on the global supply chain. Though several international ships patrol that space, nonetheless, in case of a conflict involving Iran, possibility of closure of the Strait remains high. Likelihood of Pakistan-flagged ships coming under attack or stoppage of Pakistan-bound ships being operated by other companies may also figure higher. The way things are happening in Russo-Ukraine war, Yemen and Palestine-Israel conflict, a probability of a protracted conflict involving maritime domain off Iran appears reckonable. This unequivocally require the Navy to be fully prepared to not just protect the maritime traffic but also combat traditional and sub-conventional threats that may emerge in and around Gulf of Oman as a result of the potential US/ West-Iran military showdown.

Role of Pakistan Navy is crucial in safeguarding vital national interests in view of looming threats of war and crisis in the Indian Ocean region. In pursuance of Pakistan’s foreign policy, which predicates on ‘seeking peace and stability through international cooperation,’ Pakistan Navy adopts the strategy of ‘presence and international engagement’. Through regular stewarding of critical areas in and around Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden, the Navy conducts ‘Regional Maritime Security Patrols’ making sure security and stability in the immediate areas of our national interest, while collaborating with willing and like-minded partners in maritime security constructs.

‘Presence’ enables Pakistan Navy an early warning and a capability to deter both traditional and sub-conventional threats, disincentivizing the actors’ potential recourse to violence. Being a ‘ready and responsive’ military service, Pakistan Navy is the first to transition from a peacetime posture to war within a short timeframe, as was demonstrated in the aftermath of the Indian Parliament attack, 2001, Mumbai incident, 2008 and Pulwama, 2019 crisis. In these incidents, it was usual to predict an algorithmically articulated Indian war mongering against Pakistan, i.e., terror incident - blame Pakistan - shape the environment - conduct a surgical strike on the contrived Pak terror-complicity pretext. Naval presence, in almost all of these incidents effectively communicated to the adversary, to abandon a reckless plan of use of combat power against Pakistan. Because of the Pakistan Navy’s swift disposition inhibiting the Indian navy any operational leverage, it can rightly be called a stabilizing force in a regional crisis situation.

‘Engagement’ is the second cornerstone of Pakistan Navy’s peacetime operational posture, empowering it be an agent of stability and order in the Arabian Sea, in particular. The Navy remains integral to the UN-mandated and other international efforts to create and sustain a peaceful maritime environment for human activity. This element is aligned with our national approach to openness and friendliness in international relations. Engagement has fostered a culture of trust and support, as has been witnessed since 2007 when first edition of Aman exercise was held in Karachi. Since then the number of participants kept increasing, with a potential of over 50 nations joining Aman the next year.

Through ‘presence and engagement,’ Pakistan Navy seeks dual operational advantages: a) ensuring protection of own vital maritime interests through collaborative efforts; and b) deterring current and potential adversaries from manifesting their nefarious designs against Pakistan. As things unfold, one thing arguably is very clear that it would be the sea where much of our future security, economic and strategic interests intersect with other nations’ interests. Though land could still figure out as an influential factor in a future conflict between India and Pakistan, but it may not be the decisive factor alone. Keeping in view the role of the Navy in the prevalent and emerging geopolitical settings, the developing environment and Indian profound focus on the development of its navy, there’s no denying the fact that Pakistan Navy will undoubtedly become a force of choice for Pakistan’s national security.

Sohail a. azmie

–The writer is an Islamabad-based researcher. His areas of interest include: Maritime Security, Climate Change and Astropolitics