In the realm of security, if any policy on Balochistan existed, it was upended during the night between the 25th and 26th of August. Darkness changed perspectives on Balochistan. The security forces not only failed to forestall terrorism but also failed to respond swiftly to the violence that drenched the province in blood. Apparently, they were caught off guard, leaving them paralysed.
The notorious Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for launching a series of synchronised attacks across ten districts, disrupting highways and railways, setting vehicles ablaze, and taking the lives of over seventy people, mostly from Punjab. The Levies and Frontier Constabulary also bore the brunt of the Majeed Brigade of the BLA, which launched Operation Herof (Black Storm). The overall loss of property and human life was unprecedented. Balochistan now presents a complex scenario to navigate.
Things were comparatively simpler a few years ago. On May 14, 2006, Mian Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League and the late Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party signed the Charter of Democracy (CoD) in London. Back in Pakistan, the late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti gathered the courage to remain politically relevant. Bugti raised the slogan: “On land and sea resources of Balochistan, the Baluch have the first right.” At that time, the rape of Dr Shazia Khalid in Sui’s hospital (in Dera Bugti) on January 3, 2005, had already strained relations between Bugti and the Centre, which was being run by the late General Pervez Musharraf. On top of this, Bugti demanded greater autonomy for Balochistan. Subsequent events spiralled out of control, culminating in Bugti’s death on August 26, 2006, in a collapsed cave in Kohlu, east of Quetta.
What Bugti could not see in his lifetime occurred posthumously. In 2008, Musharraf fled to London in self-imposed exile. On November 23, 2009, the signatories of the CoD secured approval from Pakistan’s Parliament for a reform package called Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e- Balochistan to address Baluch grievances. The package, which was an attempt to correct historical wrongs, consisted of 61 proposals in total. Seven key proposals included the formation of a judicial commission and a fact-finding mission to investigate the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a judicial inquiry into the killing of three other Baluch nationalist leaders, the establishment of a commission to aid the return of exiled Baluch, the opening of a political dialogue with Baluch dissidents, the tracing and release of political prisoners, the rationalisation of the formula for the royalty of natural resources, and the allocation of a percentage of profits from natural resources to the development of the area from which the resource originated.
In April 2010, predicated on the CoD, Pakistan’s Parliament passed the 18th Constitutional Amendment to espouse the concept of provincial autonomy. The amendment also plugged loopholes to prevent any military takeover. The 7th National Finance Commission Award (signed in December 2009) was issued in July 2010, indicating that Punjab had sacrificed part of its financial share (1.27%) to the advantage of Balochistan. However, in March 2011, Senator Raza Rabbani, who was heading the parliamentary committee responsible for implementing the reform package by the end of 2013, announced his resignation, stating that the government had implemented only 15 of the 61 proposals. Furthermore, the key proposals remained untouched. In May 2013, general elections were held in Pakistan. Following this, Pakistan witnessed a deterioration in the situation in Balochistan, which disappeared from the list of national priorities. In 2014, the dharna (sit-in) politics captured the Centre’s attention. The rest is history.
The departure of Bugti in 2006 ended the era of Baluch nationalist Sardars (tribal heads), and the failure to implement the Balochistan reform package by 2013 ended the era of rectifying history in favour of the Baluch. This is the point where the Baluch youth entered the equation.
Across Pakistan, post-2014 has been marked by growing awareness among the youth, who chose to support one political party against another. These divisive political activities not only changed the internal dynamics of Pakistan but also impacted Balochistan. A significant display has been the emergence of Baluch youth with a clear inclination towards Baluch nationalism, filling the void left by the inaction of Baluch nationalist Sardars. At the same time, there is ample evidence that a portion of Baluch youth became disaffected with the Centre and joined the armed struggle. This is how organisations such as the BLA received fresh blood to sustain armed resistance aimed at secession.
The post-2014 era has exacerbated the alienation of Balochistan, which questions the legitimacy of political representation despite provincial autonomy under the constitution. Development at the cost of rigged elections is a paradox that Balochistan faces. Post-2014 has also seen Baluch women replacing men. Representing the soft face of Baluch nationalism through peaceful demonstrations, Dr Mahrang Baluch, along with her female associates, visited Islamabad in December 2023. The Centre refused to heed her entreaties. The next month, she returned to Balochistan and narrated how the Centre had treated Baluch women. She publicly revealed that Islamabad police had lowered the shalwars (trousers) of peacefully protesting Baluch women. However, on August 26, representing the hard face of Baluch nationalism, another Baluch woman emerged. She was a final-year law student, Mahal Baluch (alias Zalan Kurd), who became a suicide bomber, attacking a Frontier Constabulary camp in the Bela area of Lasbela District.
In short, young educated Baluch women replacing men to champion the Baluch cause indicates that Baluch society has undergone a drastic change. Certainly, Pakistan needs a new Balochistan policy.
Dr Qaisar Rashid
The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com
