As the Ukraine crisis is forging ahead, so are the worries of the US, which is facing a foreign policy challenge of calibrating its attention between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Are Russian hegemonic designs a bigger threat to the US and its allies, or the rapidly growing Chinese influence, is the question that US seems to be grappling with at the moment. Until February this year, the US Indo-Pacific strategy was being pushed with good vigour, however post-Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US appears to be facing some disappointments and distractions.
The Quad, one of the outcomes of US the Indo-Pacific strategy, has four members, three of whom have condemned Russia vehemently while India has abstained from doing so, and yet is asking for the end of the crisis. The other three members, the US, Japan and Australia have been seemingly disappointed over India’s response initially, but are now stating that they understand India’s position on the issue and aim to use India’s relations with Russia positively.
On March 3, 2022, the heads of Quad member states met virtually and among other issues, discussed the Ukraine crisis. They reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states is respected and countries are free from military, economic and political coercion. The joint readout released after the summit had said that the leaders discussed the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine besides assessing its comprehensive implications. They also agreed to meet in Tokyo in the coming months, most probably in June this year.
There have been reports of the West’s anxiety on India’s muted response to the Ukraine’s situation. According to a report in Reuters, the US Assistant Secretary of State in South Asia, Donald Lu, stated at a Senate subcommittee hearing that, “Washington had been fighting a ‘pitched battle’ with India in diplomatic channels to urge it to take a clear position opposed to Russian actions in Ukraine”. In the same report, he is quoted to have said that the US is looking very closely at whether to apply sanctions on India over its arms deal with Russia. A report in Nikkei Asia stated that in the virtual Quad meet held on March 3, “The US, Japan, and Australia called on India to join the rest of the group in denouncing Russia over its invasion of Ukraine”. A joint statement after the Japanese PM’s recent visit to India to attend the annual summit between the two countries said that both the leaders called for an immediate cessation of violence in Ukraine, pitched for resolution of the conflict through dialogue besides underscoring the importance of safety and security of nuclear facilities in that country. So, India held its position of no critique of Russia.
For India, more than the other three members, condemning Russia is tough, if not impossible. For the US, Australia and Japan, this Indian ambivalence is not easily digestible. For India, the Ukraine crisis has called for a delicate balancing act. To some, it appears that India has the option of standing with the US, yet the relationship with Russia has stood the test of time for India. It is thus more prudent for India to balance relations between the US and its age-old partner. It needs to be underscored that Russia has been and continues to be India’s main supplier of arms. And for India to be a net security provider as embodied in the Indo-Pacific strategy, it is important that it retains a solid military capability, which is overwhelmingly of Russian origin.
Since the start of the Ukraine crisis, it is the Indian response that has been subjected to review from various angles. Contrary to this, it is in fact the US response that mandates attention more than anything else. The US is confronted with a major challenge here in designating who is enemy number one; China or Russia. The US has to decide whether Europe merits attention to impede the Russian advance or whether the Quad deserves focus to confront China. There are a myriad of views based on the historic evidence on US behaviour. In South-East Asia, there could be apprehensions that the US may once again get bogged down in European affairs and forget South-East Asian states just as it did before during the turmoil in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In such a scenario, where will Quad be? However, if the US pursues its Indo-Pacific strategy, it will have to look away from the Indian response to the Ukraine crisis and its relations with Russia. The onus of responsibility is thus, on the US and not on India.
Given the prevailing situations both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the US is unlikely to push India beyond a certain point. The muted response on the import of discounted oil by India from Russia is a case in this point. The Ukraine crisis challenges the US on its foreign policy front. An interesting question thus arises here; will the Quad survive the Ukraine challenge?
The Quad, one of the outcomes of US the Indo-Pacific strategy, has four members, three of whom have condemned Russia vehemently while India has abstained from doing so, and yet is asking for the end of the crisis. The other three members, the US, Japan and Australia have been seemingly disappointed over India’s response initially, but are now stating that they understand India’s position on the issue and aim to use India’s relations with Russia positively.
On March 3, 2022, the heads of Quad member states met virtually and among other issues, discussed the Ukraine crisis. They reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states is respected and countries are free from military, economic and political coercion. The joint readout released after the summit had said that the leaders discussed the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine besides assessing its comprehensive implications. They also agreed to meet in Tokyo in the coming months, most probably in June this year.
There have been reports of the West’s anxiety on India’s muted response to the Ukraine’s situation. According to a report in Reuters, the US Assistant Secretary of State in South Asia, Donald Lu, stated at a Senate subcommittee hearing that, “Washington had been fighting a ‘pitched battle’ with India in diplomatic channels to urge it to take a clear position opposed to Russian actions in Ukraine”. In the same report, he is quoted to have said that the US is looking very closely at whether to apply sanctions on India over its arms deal with Russia. A report in Nikkei Asia stated that in the virtual Quad meet held on March 3, “The US, Japan, and Australia called on India to join the rest of the group in denouncing Russia over its invasion of Ukraine”. A joint statement after the Japanese PM’s recent visit to India to attend the annual summit between the two countries said that both the leaders called for an immediate cessation of violence in Ukraine, pitched for resolution of the conflict through dialogue besides underscoring the importance of safety and security of nuclear facilities in that country. So, India held its position of no critique of Russia.
For India, more than the other three members, condemning Russia is tough, if not impossible. For the US, Australia and Japan, this Indian ambivalence is not easily digestible. For India, the Ukraine crisis has called for a delicate balancing act. To some, it appears that India has the option of standing with the US, yet the relationship with Russia has stood the test of time for India. It is thus more prudent for India to balance relations between the US and its age-old partner. It needs to be underscored that Russia has been and continues to be India’s main supplier of arms. And for India to be a net security provider as embodied in the Indo-Pacific strategy, it is important that it retains a solid military capability, which is overwhelmingly of Russian origin.
Since the start of the Ukraine crisis, it is the Indian response that has been subjected to review from various angles. Contrary to this, it is in fact the US response that mandates attention more than anything else. The US is confronted with a major challenge here in designating who is enemy number one; China or Russia. The US has to decide whether Europe merits attention to impede the Russian advance or whether the Quad deserves focus to confront China. There are a myriad of views based on the historic evidence on US behaviour. In South-East Asia, there could be apprehensions that the US may once again get bogged down in European affairs and forget South-East Asian states just as it did before during the turmoil in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In such a scenario, where will Quad be? However, if the US pursues its Indo-Pacific strategy, it will have to look away from the Indian response to the Ukraine crisis and its relations with Russia. The onus of responsibility is thus, on the US and not on India.
Given the prevailing situations both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the US is unlikely to push India beyond a certain point. The muted response on the import of discounted oil by India from Russia is a case in this point. The Ukraine crisis challenges the US on its foreign policy front. An interesting question thus arises here; will the Quad survive the Ukraine challenge?
