Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the first-ever summit of BRICS+ from 22 to 24 October 2024 in the Tatarstan city of Kazan. The founding members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) formally welcomed five new members, i.e., Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), indicating an emphasis on the energy security and related geo-economic interests of the bloc’s founding members. Understandably, BRICS expanded its membership and strengthened its goals for economic cooperation and global influence. Nevertheless, despite its geo-strategic importance, Pakistan’s exclusion from membership was noticeable. Pakistan’s economic fragility, political instability, distressed security situation, American influence over Pakistan, and unresolved disputes with India could have been contributing factors for the decision to withhold Pakistan’s inclusion in the BRICS+ bloc. However, Russia’s recent outreach by sending higher civil and military delegations to Pakistan is considered a positive development in the right direction towards finding a long-awaited balance in foreign policy.

On the other hand, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a significant bilateral meeting on 23 October, which Indian media portrayed as a rapprochement at BRICS. Reportedly, both leaders signalled a breakthrough in the protracted and entangled negotiations on ensuring peace along the troubled 3,000 km border between the two countries. India’s Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh, said that the two countries have reached a broad consensus to restore the ground situation based on principles of equal and mutual security. In 2020, in the Galwan Valley, 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers were killed in a clash, leading to a marked deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. India banned many Chinese consumer products, including TikTok. However, a combination of factors, such as India’s growing disillusionment with the West, its need for Chinese investments, and China opening its doors to Indian business tycoons, may have accounted for this change. India’s relations with the Western bloc, particularly the US and Canada, had hit stumbling blocks. India did not back the West’s case against Russia’s attack on Ukraine. India and the US are at odds over foreign policy, with India not wanting to go against Russia or confront China as per US expectations. Consequently, India is reaffirming its relations with Russia and making advances towards China, much to the dismay of the United States, which had declared India a “strategic partner”. In pursuit of its strategic economic interest, India continued to buy crude oil from sanctioned Russia at a concessional rate, refined it, and profited by selling it to energy-starved Western Europe.

Overall, economic imperatives and geopolitical developments seem intertwined to shape events in favour of a cooling-off period between India and China. India’s need to develop its industry is pushing it to foster closer ties with China and shed some of its security-related fears. India’s key industries are heavily dependent on Chinese intermediaries, ranging from basic items like nails, tacks, and umbrellas to sophisticated telecom, electronics, and pharmaceutical intermediates. In 2019–20, over 83% of India’s mobile phone imports and nearly 90% of imported colour TV sets were from China. India’s motorcycle, automobile, solar energy panels/cells, and textile and garment industries also depend heavily on imports from China. As of 2022–23, China was India’s third-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade standing at US$ 136.26 billion in 2022.

Despite being two of the globe’s greatest strategic adversaries, US trade with China has grown from $4 billion in 1979 to over $750 billion in 2022. Amid growing economic connections between Moscow and Beijing, the annual value of bilateral trade has reached $240 billion. Meanwhile, in 2022, Pakistan’s exports totalled $38.6 billion, making it the 66th largest exporter in the world. Over the past five years, imports from China to Pakistan have increased at an annual rate of 3.51%, rising from $17.7 billion in 2017 to $21 billion in 2022. Conversely, in 2022, Pakistan’s exports to China stood at only $2.79 billion (mainly copper, cotton, and rice).

This trade volume, despite security and political disputes between China and India and between China and the US, should serve as a guiding light for policymakers in Pakistan. It goes without saying that a country’s economic interests should be the foundation upon which all state policies are firmly built. A fair justice system, respect for the constitution, and adherence to the people’s mandate ensure political stability, which is the bedrock of economic progress and security stability. Any missing ingredient in this recipe is bound to spoil the outcome, which explains why successive governments in Pakistan have struggled to fully achieve the ultimate national interest, i.e., “Security and well-being of its people”. The SCO and BRICS+ blocs provide opportunities for a country like Pakistan to re-prioritise and reshape its bilateral as well as multilateral relations, restore politico-economic stability, and pursue national interests in the true sense rather than seeking embarrassing short-term relief through begging and borrowing.

Saleem Qamar Butt
The writer is a retired senior army officer with experience in international relations, military diplomacy and analysis of geo-political and strategic security issues.